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I
N EVALUATING the impressive array of judicial decisions which
have upheld liberal labor enactments, students of the social scene
have overlooked one rich repository of data-the briefs and arguments of those whose task it has been to make these enactments palatable
to the Supreme Court. Yet these materials provide fresh insight not only
into the values of our industrial society, but into the Court as an instrument through which these values find expression. It is in the briefs and
arguments of counsel defending the constitutionality of labor-welfare
legislation-more so than in the language of the judicial decisions themselves-that the smoke of social tension and conflict is often more perceptible, and the social values which emerge more articulate. This may be
ascribed less to any proclivity on the part of judges to conceal these values,
than to the common tendency of men in all walks of life to make ethical
judgments ad hoc, without laying bare the fundamental precepts upon
which they are based.
One is struck by the presence of a persistent factor in the presentation
of the labor-welfare cases before the Court-this despite wide gaps of time,
despite variations in issues, despite the diversity of legal talent responsible
for the preparation of the briefs and arguments. In very few instances
have counsel in these cases relied solely on the argument of "reasonable
deprivation," i.e., the argument that this type of legislation has been de* The author is indebted to Professor Walton Hamilton and Professor Max Lerner for their
helpful suggestions in the preparation of this article. The responsibility for the views expressed is, of course, solely the author's.
t Department of Government, West Virginia University; on leave to the War Manpower
Commission.
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termined by the legislative bodies to be socially desirable, and that even
though it may militate against the property rights of management in
terms of extra cost, the burden it imposes is nevertheless reasonable. Instead, they have persisted in demonstrating to the Court that no matter
how great the benefits to labor, the costs would not be borne by management. Not content merely to urge that these measures do no harm to
the interests of management, counsel in many instances have mustered
extensive factual data to impress upon the Court thit these measures,
though framed in terms of labor welfare, actually inure to the benefit of
the interests of management. By contrast, the Court, in upholding these
enactments, rarely makes these considerations articulate. Instead, the
items of justification are usually couched in terms of employee welfare
or in such broad expressions as "harmonious whole," "community interest," "social welfare," etc. This may be demonstrated with but few
exceptions in most of the important labor-welfare cases from Holden v.
Hardy to the National LaborRelationsBoard-Jones-Laughlincontroversy.
II
Hours of labor in underground mines:-One of the early enactments relating to the welfare of labor was an act of the Utah legislature in 1896,
which placed a maximum limit upon the number of hours of work in
underground mines. The clash over its constitutionality came in the celebrated case of Holden v. Hardy.' Counsel for Hardy, seeking to uphold
the validity of the legislation, argued:
The investigation of hospital records and health statistics concerning labor in
mines and smelters by the Legislature before the passage of this act; the general discussions of its merits and advantages, its approval by most mine owners' and by employees .... the fact that experience of mining and smelter employers and employees
showed in those particular industries more labor could be done in a year when employees

worked eight hours per day than when they attempted to work ten hours per day .... are
matters not appearing in the record, but were facts of which the court below very
properly took notice as facts of general knowledge.3
.... In the enactment of this law the legislature had before it .... the clause of
the State Constitution enjoining legislation for the health and safety of miners; the
discussion of this clause and of the particular bill before its passage both in the daily
press and in the legislature; the investigations and reports of legislative committees
as to the effect upon health of underground miners and employees in smelters of long
hours of work; the statistics so obtained showing that where such employees worked
' x69 U.S. 366 (z898).
2For the sake of convenience, italics will be regarded as the author's unless otherwise
specified.
' Brief for Defendant in Error ix.
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ten or twelve hours per day, the usual result was that such employee was "leaded" or
otherwise disabled, and was compelled to lose from one fourth to one third of the days
in each month ..... And that with these matters thoroughly and at length discussed
and considered this statute was enacted by unanimousvote of the State Senate and by over
two-thirds of the House. As to oljections which have developed later, we have heard none.
The law received the general approval of both employers and employees.4

In brief, this argument constituted an assurance (1) that the support of
the legislation was widespread, (2) that sufficient consideration was given
to the merits of the legislation to repel the possible stigma of arbitrariness,
and (3)that the legislation was not antagonistic to the interests of management-in fact, would result in greater efficiency in the productive
process.
By contrast, the Court's opinion, upholding the enactment, seemed to
view it as a legitimate measure for limiting "self-interested" employers
who endeavor, by virtue of their superior economic position, to take advantage of their employees:
The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the experience of legislators in
many states has corroborated, that the proprietors of these establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an equality, and their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from their
employees, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to
regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental
to their health and strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and
the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such cases self-interest is
often an unsafe guide, and the legislature may properly interpose its authority.5

No mention was made of the argument urged by counsel that the legislation had, among other things, the general approval of the employers.
The "scrip" law_-In 19oi, the Supreme Court considered the validity
of a Tennessee statute which created a duty upon all persons, firms, corporations, or companies using scrip, "punchouts," "store orders," etc., as
a media of payment, to redeem the scrip in legal tender when demanded
by the employees. 6 Counsel for the Knoxville Iron Company, arguing
against the legislation, dramatized the deleterious effect of such "paternalistic legislation" and warned of the dangers of its extension. 7 To demonstrate how it impinged upon the freedom of business enterprise, an attempt was made to show that the legislation was tantamount to a direct
4Ibid., at 32.
si69 U.S. 366, 397 (x898).
6Knoxville Iron Company v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (r9o).
7"In nothing is the tide of paternalistic legislation sweeping higher than in the attempted
regulation of dealings between employers and employees ..... The consequences of the de'cision of this question, which will inevitably determine to a great extent whether the present
legislative tendency shall be checked, or whether it shall be encouraged in its flood, involves
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regulation of wages-the assumption, of course, being that as such it was
invalid on its face.'
Counsel for Harbison, the defendant in error, arguing for the validity
of the statute, emphasized the fact that it did not really militate against
the interests of those represented by the Knoxville Iron Company:
The statute does not require the payment of a single penny in excess of the contract
of employment, nor the payment in any other mode or medium than that fixed by the
contract. The statute simply regulates the method of payment; it does not shorten the
time between pay days;it does not increase the amount of wages;it does not mae a contract
between employer and employee; it simply requiresthe employer, when it is demanded, to
pay the wages of the laborerin money according to the originalcontract.9
It neither interferes with existing contracts nor does it contain a prohibition against
future contracts. It is not in the least degree oppressive to the employer because it imposes
no burdenupon him which he did not assume when he engaged the services of the employee.
It is necessary to the welfare of the employee, because it enables him to obtain the full
amount of his wages without being compelled to take payment thereof in coal,which
he cannot consume, or in coal orders which he cannot convert into money except at

costly discount.'
This was to inform the Court that whatever benefit would accrue to the
employees as a result of the legislation would not be gained at the expense
of the employers. 'The decision of the Court in this case, per Shiras, J.,
recorded with rare frankness that "[the plaintiff in error] in no event pays
more in dollars and cents for labor than the contract price."' ,,
Hours of laborfor women.-Due to the influence of Mr. Brandeis' widely heralded "sociological brief," the case of Muller v. Oregon,'2 coming before the Court in i9o8, was regarded by many- as marking a new era in
the realm of jurisprudence. It is because of the importance then and now
attributed to it that an analysis of the brief and the resultant decision
merits revived attention. The Oregon statute involved forbade the emfar-reaching consequences whose"ultimate results can scarcely be overestimated. If this Act
be sustained it will in all probability be followed by much other legislation of the same character; if held constitutional the new departure in legislation will be checked." Brief for Plaintiff
in Error 8.
8 "Its [the act's] only object can be to attempt to enforce a higher rate of wages through
payment in cash instead of merchandise. Its framers ....

overlooked ....

the fundamental

fact that wages are necessarily the result of the operation of economic laws, depending, in the
last analysis, upon the law of supply and demand, which regulates the rate of wages as inevitably as it regulates the rate of interest upon capital. With a given competition to which the
industries of the State are subjected .... the rate of wages cannot be permanently fixed higher
than the result of this competition will justify .... so that if temporarily raised above what
economic laws would justify in the fact of this competition, the inevitable result must be ....
a cessation of industry and driving of both capital and labor from the domain of the state."
Ibid., at 22.
9 Brief for Defendant in Error 5-

lo Ibid., at x3.

t 183 U.S. 13, 20 (r9ox).
12208 U.S. 4T,2 (1908).
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ployment of females in any mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry
for more than ten hours during any one day. The strategy of the Brandeis
brief, prepared to convince the Court of the validity of the legislation, is
most revealing. Approximately fifteen pages were devoted to an effort to
ward off any possible shock of innovation or daring experiment. In these
pages were listed the extensive American and foreign legislation on hours
of labor already in existence. This gave assurance that such legislation
would result in no strange social innovations. It was an appeal to the
Court's innate conservatism. Thirty-seven pages were devoted to a presentation of evidence showing the direct relation of long hours of labor to
the health of women in industry; seven pages were devoted to the proposition that shorter hours would result in better condition of health, which
would reflect itself in the home, and therefore in the community at large.
Section IV of the brief, however, contains the heart of the appeal. In approximately twenty pages, under the caption "Economic Aspect of Short
Hours," Brandeis presented an array of evidence pointed to the conclusion
that not only would the regulation not be detrimental to business, but
that it would result in an increment to business enterprise. The paragraph
headings in themselves are suggestive of the character of his drive:
A. EFFECT ON OUTPUT

The universal testimony of manufacturing countries tends to prove that the regulation of the working day acts favorably upon output. With long hours, output declines;
with short hours, it rises ..... Production is not only increased, but improved in
quality.13
B. EFFECT ON REGULARITY OF EMPLOYENT

Wherever the employment of women has been prohibited for more than ten hours
in one day, a more equal distribution of work throughout the year has followed. The
supposed need of dangerously long and irregular hours in the season trades are shown
to be unnecessary. In place of alternating periods of intense overwork with periods of
idleness, employers have found it possible to avoid such irregularities by foresight and
management.4
C. ADAPTATION OF CUSTOMERS TO SHORTER HOURS

Experience shows how the demands of customers yield to the requirements of a fixed
working day. When customers are obliged to place orders sufficiently in advance to
enable them to be filled without necessitating overtime work, compliance with this

habit becomes automatic.xs

D. INCENTIVE TO IMPROVEMENT IN MANUFACTURE

The regulation of the working day has acted as a stimulus to improvement in processes of manufacture. Invention of new machinery and perfection of old methods have
followed the introduction of shorter hours.' 6
13 Brief for Defendant in Error 65.

'4

Ibid., at 77.

'S

Ibid., at 79.

6 Ibid., at 8o.
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E. UNIFORMITY ESSENTIAL TO JUSTICE TO EMPLOYERS

To grant exceptions from the restriction of hours to certain industries places a premium upon irregularity and the evasion of law. When restrictions are uniform, the law
operates without favor and without injury to individuals. Few employers are able to
grant their employees reductions of hours, even if they are convinced of its advantages,
when their competitors are under no such obligation. Justice to the employer as well
as to the employee therefore requires that the law set a fixed limit of hours for working
women and a limit for all alike."7

Even more assurance was forthcoming in the presentation of what Mr.
Brandeis captioned "Opinions of Employers," containing statements representative of industry in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States,
corroborating his thesis that such "welfare legislation" should be sanctioned not only because of its value to the laborers involved, but because
of the benefits to inure to the business class. The Court's acknowledgment
of this argument took the following form:
As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of
women becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength
and vigor of the race. The limitations which this state places upon her contractual
powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are
not imposed solely for her benefit, but also for the benefit of all.x8

The "of all" would seem to indicate that the Court will acquiesce in experimentation devoted to "social welfare" when it can be convinced, as it
evidently was in the Muller case, that benefits to employees will at the

same time result in benefits to the business class. At least, the Court
must be convinced that business or industry is not to carry the costs of the
legislative venture.

From the standpoint of the direction of the attack, the Brandeis brief
cannot be called an innovation. The assurance to business interests that

employee welfare was not to be gained at their expense was also present
in the Holden case. What is different is that the Brandeis brief represents
the crystallization of the attitude into a sharpened technique. The fact

that Mr. Brandeis repeatedly utilized the identical pattern in other cases
in which he argued the merits of social legislation lends credence to this
view. Thus, in the famous Sclhweinler case, argued before the highest New
York tribunal, the brief prepared by Mr. Brandeis and Miss Goldmark
contained over eighty pages devoted to the analysis of the effect upon

"business" of the law outlawing night-work for women. The following are
typical:
"7Ibid., at 82.
18 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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The experience of those countries which have longest prohibited employment at
night, shows that commercial prosperity is not hampered by such regulation. According to testimony of observers, the increased efficiency of the workers, due to the regular
rest at night has reacted so favorably upon output that commercial prosperity has
profited instead of being injured by the prohibition of women's nightwork. The apprehensions of danger to industry expressed by employers before nightwork prohibition
went into effect proved to be groundless. The opposition which accompanied the introduction of the law in various countries has yielded to the proof of its beneficial action.9

The testimony of manufacturing countries tends to prove that the output of night
work is inferior to that of daywork. Quality and quantity both degenerate. The profits
from the uninterruptea use of plants which are operated by night as well as by day are
reduced by the increased running expense, the wear on machinery and the lessened
efficiency of the workers. The prohibition of nightwork, by preserving the health and
energies of the workers, as well as the material equipments, tends to increase production.20

In Hawley v. Walker,2 1 the Brandeis-Goldmark brief contained the same
thought:
The increased efficiency of the workers due to shorter working hours, together with
the general improvement of industrial communities in physique and morals, reacts so
favorably upon that output that commercial prosperity is heightened rather than
impaired by legal limitation of hours. =
The universal testimony of manufacturing countries tends to prove that the regulation of the working day acts favorably upon output. With the long hours, output dedines; with short hours, it rises. The heightened efficiency of the workers, due to the
shorter day, more than counterbalances any loss of time. Production is not only increased but improved in quality.23
19 Brandeis and Goldmark, The Case against Nightwork for Women 226-Brief in People v.
Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, io8 N.E. 639 (1915).

20Ibid. (brief), at 291. By contrast, it is interesting to note the interpretation placed upon
the Schweinler brief in a recently published work on labor problems: "Opposition to nightwork, especially for women, was if anything even more strenuous than in the case of the long
working day. Many public spirited people, among them social workers, teachers, physicians
and legislators, felt that work at night was harmful to the individual and a menace to the
national wellbeing. Perhaps the clearest and most comprehensive statement of this position is
contained in the brief drawn up by Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark in People v.
Schweinler Press. This document is full of quotations from official reports, medical works, and
sociological treatises. Much was made of the opinion that nightwork was dangerous to the
health of the individual in that sleep during the day was less refreshing than at night; that it
was more likely to lead to illness and accident than daywork; and that it was in opposition to
efforts to promote education and reduce illiteracy. Nightwork, it was argued, also had a bad
effect on morals and destroyed family life." MacDonald and Stein, The Worker and Government 37 (1935). Like many other interpretations of the "sociological brief," this fails to take
cognizance of the extended data used in the brief to assure the Court that the legislation will
inure to the benefit of the business interests.
2' 232 U.S. 718 (194). This involved the validity of an Ohio statute regulating the hours
of labor for women working in factories, etc.
23 Ibid., at 407.
22 Brief for Defendant in Error 400.
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In Miller v. Wilson 2 4 and Bosley v. McLaughlin,25 involving the constitutionality of the California eight-hour day for women, counsel for plaintiffs

in error spared no language in dramatizing for the benefit of the Court the
impending dangers of such legislation:
The daily papers are now filled during the legislative days with accounts of every
sort of proposal ....
for the ....
ills of the times,-minimum wage laws, compulsory
insurance, a complete liability on the part of the employers, irrespective of the negligence of the injured employee, etc., the danger of all this is obvious enough to one who
has at all studied the development of government in this country.
Once the public has grown used to an uncurbed indulgence in interferencewith
private rights, it will be difficult, not to say dangerous, to attempt to bring it back to
salutary limits. A season of reform has set in with uncommon severity.
Every citizen wants to reform-his neighbor's affairs. It costs no self-denial, not
even that of careful consideration. Unchecked by the courts, paternalism, socialism,
and universal government would sweep over us, for the process of passing such laws is
so easy, and it has the charm of benevolence without cost. The man in the street car is
26
coming into his own.
From the days of Athens and Cleon down to that of [the] French Committee of
Safety there has been no tyranny like that of the unchecked majority of "the people"and it's been the more thorough that it was always under the cloak of salus populi. So
we come back to the first principle,--that the freedom of contract, that sine qua non of
property rights, will be frittered away, unless the courts enforce the constitutional rule
that any restrictions of an adult citizen's right to contract must be necessary to his or
27
her health-reasonably necessary, not merely possibly beneficial.

That the Court in the face of this emotional barrage should unanimously
uphold the legislation spoke well for the efforts of Mr. Brandeis and Miss
Goldmark. Their chief reliance was upon the persuasive weight of "the
world's experience concerning the hours of labor for women in industry,
submitted to this court in Muller v. Oregon and Hawley v. Walker. '' s
Although the Court acknowledged Muller v. Oregon as a forceful precedent, the currents which underlay the Brandeis brief in that case were not
exposed. Instead, the ratio decidendi of the Muller case was judicially
characterized as being "based on considerations relating to woman's
physical structure, her maternal functions, and the vital importance of
her protection in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."' 9
Hours of laborfor men in manufacturing establishments.--Despitethe
fact that the briefs in Bunting v. Oregon30 and Stettler v. O'Harab'were only
24 236

U.S. 385 (I914).

26

U.S. 373 (I914). The briefs in both of these cases were combined.
Brief for Plaintiff in Error 16.
29 Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 385, 396 (1914).

'7

Ibid., at 85.

25 236

28 Brief for Defendant in Error 3.

30243 U.S. 426 (i957).

3' 243 U.S. 629 (1917).
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partially prepared by Mr. Brandeis, the Brandeis influence is so evident
in their make-up as to permit their inclusion in the cluster of cases bearing
his stamp. In the Bunting case, the Court32 sustained a ten-hour law for
men employed in manufacturing and mechanical establishments. The attitude toward the Court manifested in the brief is significant. In the introduction, reference was made to the incidence of Lord Shaftesbury's Ten
Hour Act:
When that Act had been in operation seventeen years, Professor William Over-

march, President of the Economics Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science ....
called the Factory Acts 'wholly successful,' spoke of the limitation of hours as a 'security against foreign competition, a guarantee of power, and a
fund of undivided profits.'33
The latter part of the brief contained an expansion of the same concept:
The universal testimony of manufacturing countries tends to prove that the shortening of the workday acts favorably upon output. The introduction of a shorter workday does not result in lessened output. Whenever reliable statistics of output have
been kept, before and after the introduction of a shorter workday, they show that with
rare exceptions the aggregate production under shorter hours has either equalled that
of the long day, or risen above it ..... The most recent investigations have confirmed
the facts, and have shown that what was true of a single industry applies to practically
all industries, and is thus not a special but a general rule.34

Greater promptness in starting in the morning and at noon, more interest and application on the part of the workers and the elimination of "soldiering" and lost time
contribute to the increased output under shorter hours.3S

With excessive hours of labor, the efficiency of the workers is so much reduced that
output deteriorates both in quantity and quality. Over-fatigue results in 'spoiled
work' which must often be done over again the next day. The early belief that profits
were dependent on the last hours of the working day has long been proved a fallacy.
On the contrary, the output of the last hours shows a steady and marked decline.36
Mr. Frankfurter and Miss Goldmark, who prepared a supplemental brief
for the plaintiff in error, continued in the same vein-but with an additional factor added, i.e. national defense:
Since the first argument of Bunting vs. Oregon .... the most notable contributions
to the world's experience with industrial fatigue and its consequences, have come from
Great Britain. The war has forced into national prominence the condition of the workers in munition plants and in other factories manufacturing war supplies. It has come
to be recognized that upon their output and efficiency depends, in the last resort, the
national defense. It has therefore been, as never before, a matter of national concern

to study and conserve the working capacity of these industrial workers.37
32

Three members of the Court dissented. Justice Brandeis took no part in the decision.

3] [

Brief for Defendant in Error x.

34 2

ibid., at 636.
at 737.

3SIbid.,

36 Ibid., at 8r9.

37 Supp. Brief for Defendant in Error upon Re-argument i.
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Minimum wage legislationfor women.-Stettler v. O'Hara,3sconcerning
the constitutionality of minimum wage legislation in Oregon, does not add
a great deal to the understanding of the technique and assumptions underlying the arguments prepared for the Court. One statement, however, by
Mr. Frankfurter tends to reveal even more clearly the direct force of the
appeal:
Efficiency proves in both England and Australia that while a small number of inefficient employers may suffer, who have relied for their profits upon cutting wages to
the lowest possible point, the establishment of minimum rates has not injured any trade
nor checked its development. In England, for instance, since minimum wages have been
fixed in the tailoring trade, exports to South Africa, the largest foreign market for
English clothing, have steadily increased.39
Here, one finds that the appeal is not indiscriminately pointed to the enhancement of all of those engaged in some form of business enterprise, but
rather to the more efficient, the more enlightened segment of the business
population, the far-sighted ones who know what, in the long run, would be
40
beneficial to the class as a whole.
I
The impact of what we have been calling "the Brandeis brief" has taken
many curious twists. Dean Pound has hailed it as a hope for the "sociological jurisprudence" which he has long championed. In one of his early
writings he noted that "something like sociological interpretation has begun in this country. The briefs submitted by Mr. Brandeis in the case of
Muller v. Oregon and in the case involving the Illinois statute as to hours
'4
of labor for women show what may be achieved in this direction."'
Happily, this statement releases a flood of much-needed light upon the
"scope and purpose" of "sociological jurisprudence '' 42 and permits a penetration into the armor of liberalism which has so often protected the school
of thought bearing such a disarming name.
Inherent as a postulate of the "Brandeis brief" (and of "sociological
jurisprudence," of which it is allegedly an embodiment), is an endorsement of experimentation, of "social engineering." Judging from the pattern of the briefs, however, it seems clear that the experimentation which
is urged upon the Court was not meant to encourage departure from the
243 U.S. 629

(1917).
39 Brief for Defendants in Error 5o6.
For a detailed development of this thesis, see Kales, "Due Process," The Inarticulate
Major Premise and the Adamson Act, 26 Yale L.J. 519 (i917).
4' Pound, Courts and Legislation, 9 Modem Legal Philosophy Series 225 (1921).
42See Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 14o,
38

40

489 (I921).
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present context of social relationships, but rather to preserve it. Its purpose was to inform the Court that a society, meeting the impact of new
industrial conditions, can best perpetuate itself by accommodating itself
to these new conditions. It contained masterful demonstrations to the
dominant business groups that the accommodating process, although involving departures in techniques, actually insured the retention of the
system under which their dominance was expressed. 43 The briefs were not
addressed to the interests of the "whole people,"44 but were more in the
nature of assurances to business enterprise that the enactments would not
4
jeopardize their interests. .
In commenting upon the significance of the cases involving the "Brandeis brief," both Frankfurter and Cardozo followed Pound in subscribing
to the "new approach" as an innovation. In his essay, "Hours of Labor
and Realism in the Law," Frankfurter characterized the innovation thus:
The emphasis is shifted to community interests, the affirmative enhancement of the
human values of the whole community-not merely society conceived of as independent

individuals dealing at arms' length with one another, in which legislation may only
seek to protect individuals under disabilities, or6prevent individual aggression in the
interest of a countervailing individual freedom.4

Cardozo, after pointing out that "the method of sociology .... puts its
emphasis on the social welfare," exemplified the method by reference to

the Schweinler case:
Courts have often been led into error in passing upon the validity of a statute, not
[from] misunderstanding of the law, but from misunderstanding of the facts. This
43 For an excellent analysis of Brandeis' position in the "social justice" period of American
history, see Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the collection of essays,
Mr. Justice Brandeis (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
44 One of the premises of the sociological jurist is "the study of actual social effects of legal
institution and doctrine." Dean Pound would contend that the "sociological" interpretation
would be in terms "of the whole people." See his analysis of Kohler, to whom he is greatly
indebted, op. cit. supra n. 41, at 224: " .... . rules of law are not to be interpreted according to
the thought and will of the lawmaker, but they are to be interpreted sociologically, they are to
be interpreted as products of the whole people whose organ the lawmaker has become."
45 However, Dean Pound's attacks upon the "economic interpretation" have been most persistent. See Pound, op. cit. supra, n. 42, at 494. In his Interpretations of Legal History 92113 (1923) may be found his criticism of the "dominance" theory of Brooks Adams, with the
reservation that ".... . it would be a grievous error to reject the economic interpretation

wholly because of the extravagance of its advocates." In The Formative Era of American Law
(1938), particularly at 83-9i, Dean Pound again minimizes the importance of the "economic
interpretation" and stresses the importance of the "taught tradition" as "the outstanding
phenomenon." See also The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 Harv. L. Rev.
363 (1941). That Dean Pound perhaps overstates his case is suggested in Cohen, Law and the
Social Order 329 (1933): "At times .... he seems to argue as if the presence of ethical motives and logical reasons proves that economic forces were not influential. This is clearly an
inadequate view, since logical, ethical and economic considerations are mutually exclusive."
41629 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 367 (1916).
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happened in New York. A statute forbidding nightwork for women was declared
arbitrary and void in 19o7. In 1915, with fuller knowledge of the investigation of
social workers, a like statute was held to be reasonable and valid. Courts know today
that statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo, as pronouncements of abstract principles for the guidance of an ideal community, but in the setting and framework of conditions, as revealed by the labors of economists and students of the social
sciences in our own country and abroad.47
Frankfurter, as well as Pound, focused his vision upon the smooth contours of "community," instead of the rough ridges inherent within it. 48
Cardozo embraced "the facts" but failed to notice the direction towards
which they were pointed.49 They both seemingly failed to make explicit
the implications of their positions.50 The sobering realism of Veblen furnishes a striking contrast: "Whatever policy furthers the commercial
gains of those business men whose domicile is within the national boundaries is felt to be beneficial to all the rest of the population."', The Brandeis
brief as a modernized appeal to a less modern end strikingly coincides with
the theory of scientific management. This new business theory was born
out of a need to inject new life into what was called "the prostrated industry and trade of the country. ' 's2 Although the Court has attempted to
sever "labor" from the connotations of the term "commodity" in the legal
sense, nevertheless in the economic and social sense, the sponsors of scien47 Nature

of the Judicial Process 81 (1922).
Frankfurter's view of "community" is shared by Prof. Maclver. In his work, Community (1928), at 55, MacIver points out: "The growth of sociology since the time of Comte
is a witness that men are beginning to realize again that there is a unity of social life, and are
seeking to restore the lost synthesis of community." Despite Prof. MacIver's unifying concept
of "community," he, however, admits "that there is ....a vital cleavage in the community,
expressed in the antithesis of capital and labor, which can be bridged only by the construction
of such a system as makes labor no longer a mere instrument of a productive mechanism, controlled by another class for its own ends ..... " Ibid., at 273.
49 The comments of an eminent historian of the Supreme Court follow a similar pattern:
"When in the last decade of the nineteenth century, [the Supreme Court] took the radical step
of expanding the old classic phrase defining the objects of the exercise of the police power'public health, safety and morals'-by interpolating the words 'public welfare,' it advanced
far towards acceptance of the theory of modem sociological jurists that the law must recognize
the priority of social interests, and that it must start from the premise that 'individual interests
are to be secured by law, because and to the extent that they are social interests.'" 2 Warren,
The Supreme Court and the United States 744 (1937). See also, Lescohier and Brandeis, History of Labor Legislation (1935), at 696: "This change ....marks a recognition of the relation of hours of labor to health and an appreciation that the health of workers is a part of
the public health. It further marks a recognition that gross inequality in economic power may
make legislative interference in some items of the labor contract a proper exercise of the
police power."
so Pound's failure to make the nature of the conflicting interests in our society explicit is
noted in Grossman, The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 44 Yale L.J. 6o5 (1935).
48

51Theory of Business Enterprise 289 (19Io).

s2Lauck, Industrial Revolution and Wages

2 (1929).

THE LABOR-WELFARE CASES

tific management have continued to regard the laborer primarily as a
machine out of which the employer should derive the maximum efficiency.5 High wages are not opposed by the proponents of this theory,
but rather are encouraged-as long as they result in lower operating
costs. 5 4 The following view of an industrial leader on the subject of scien-

tific management carries the same appeal as the Brandeis brief in the "labor-welfare" cases:
On the other hand, aside from the matter of the political and social solidarity of
this country, and approaching the question entirely from the viewpoint of materialistic
economics, it is of primary importance that labor does not become resentful and suspicious. Low costs are obviously not merely a matter of low or even of reasonable
wages. It is much a matter of efficiency as all you who are manufacturers here will
recognize. Production standards-the amount of work performed by each unit each
day-is a large factor in your costs. In view of the great deterioration in the capital
goods of the country since the war, the necessity of increased efficiency is self-evident.
Now, of course, the efficiency of labor depends to quite some extent on the state of the
labor market,-whether labor is scarce or plentiful. The average man will naturally
work harder when he realizes that if he loses his job he cannot get another one. But
fortunately, there are other factors in producing efficiency-one of the most important
is that of good-will-and we cannot expect to maintain and develop this good-will in
the long run if this process of wage readjustment is not tactfully handled.ss
Likewise, the view of the author of a well-known treatise on scientific

management:
We are learning that productivity of labor is not measured alone by hours of work,
nor even by the test of physical fatigue in a particular job. What we need to deal with
are not the limits to which men may go without physical exhaustion, but the limits
within which they may work with zest and spirit and pride of accomplishment. When
zest departs, labor becomes a drudgery. When exhaustion enters, labor becomes slavery. Zest is partly a matter of physical condition, but it is also largely influenced by
6
mental reactions.
s3 Ibid., at 47.

the war, however, a new theory has been more and more often advanced, which
may be briefly stated as follows: If wages are reduced, the purchasing power of wage-earners
is reduced with them. Therefore, considering the industry of the country as a whole, lower
wages mean smaller sales, higher wages mean larger sales. In order to find a market for their
products, industrial managers must maintain a wage scale which will permit wage-earners in
general to buy those products ..... As a very intelligent lady of my acquaintance remarks,
the joke seems to be on the capitalist. After supposing for a century or more that his profits
were being cut down by the increasing demands of his workmen, who by trade unions, 'soldiering,' and other devilish devices, compelled him to pay them more and more compared to the
work done, the capitalist has now discovered that the workmen were right after all, and that
the road to bigger profits lies through higher wages." Ibid., at 2o8. See also Commons and
Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation 215 (1920).
ss From a speech of Mr. Sam A. Ledsohn, quoted in Lauck, op. cit. supra n. 52 at 72.
s6 Ibid., at 122.
S4 "Since
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The proponents of this "new industrial revolution" not only sponsor
shorter hours of labor, not only a "living wage, 57 not only a "cultural
wage,"' 5 but even a "partnership in business."' ' 9
However genuine the humanistic elements generating this policy, the
materialistic impulse should not be overlooked. One frank expression of
this impulse merits attention: "Fundamentally, this new policy did not
have its origin in any humanitarian considerations, but arose from the
realization that if prosperity was to be revived there must be a corresponding expansion of domestic consumption." 6°
A glance at Brandeis' introduction to Gilbreth's work on scientific
management, 6' and at the testimony on railroad efficiency which he
offered the Committee on Interstate Commerce, 62 leads one to believe
that the appeals to the Court through the medium of the "sociological
brief"-are all tributaries of the same stream of thought. They are lectures to the enlightened representatives of the business community that
these labor-welfare measures are not only not incompatible with, but are
actually beneficial to, their business interests.
Since the Brandeisian episodes, many other "labor welfare" measures
have been obliged to undergo similar judicial scrutiny. The strategy of
s7 Prof. Lauck presents a revealing list of "advantages" resulting from the "living wage"
theory (ibid., at 114):
"i. A more cooperative feeling between employer and employee.
"2. A more intelligent working class and nation.

"3. The unnecessary need of unions to protect the interests of its members.
"4. The incentive for every man to do his best, be master of himself, and his environment.
"5.More capital, more and better homes, improved living conditions, with less immorality
and crime.
"6. A greatly reduced turnover.
"7. The natural death of Bolshevism."
s8Ibid., at 153.

59Note Prof. Lauck's explanation justifying this proposal: "There is another great change
going on in thousands of places scattered all over the country, namely, the acceptance by employers of the method of cooperative management, the method which, if it is carried out thoroughly, involves teaching representatives of the employees all about the business in which they
are concerned. It does not involve any diminution of authority in the management; but it does
involve greater knowledge of the business in superintendents, foremen and the rank and file.
And this, to my thinking, is one of the most promising of the present industrial phenomena,
likely to lead to a wholesome evolution in the conduct of the industries of other nations; because when employees are persuaded that they are partners with the employer, that the plant
is theirs in a true sense, and that it is for their interest to make it as profitable as possible by
stopping wastes, effecting economies, and improving discipline, the gain is so enormous that no
nation which does not adopt cooperative management will be able to compete with us." Ibid.,
at 74.

6 Ibid., at

200.

61 Gilbreth,

Primer of Scientific Management vii

(1912).

Scientific Management and the Railroads (igix) (part of a brief submitted to the I.C.C.
in 1911). See also Brandeis, Business, A Profession 11-12 (1925).
62
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counsel in these cases, especially since the Brandeis technique has become
the common property of the profession, is worth noting.
Methods of wage payments.-One of these measures concerned the mode
of payment of miners' wages. An Arkansas statute made it unlawful to
use screened coal as a basis for paying miners. The object of the law was
to prevent fraud to the miner in the determination of the amount of coal
actually mined and to substitute what the legislature deemed to be a fairer
standard. The issue came to a head in McLean v. Arkansas.63 The argument presented to the Court on behalf of McLean was mainly concerned
with "freedom of contract." "If the miner gets what he contracts for," it
was asked, "what is there that is fraudulent or wrong about it?" "Who
can say," counsel continued, "that the men employed do not know better
what is to their interests than the wisest legislative assembly that has ever
convened on earth?" "And whose business is it, whose right does it invade, what principle of public policy does it violate, wherein is the welfare
of society impaired?"6 4 To this argument came the reply:
The general public is probably more interested in the great coal fields of the country
and the work and development thereof than any other industry of the land. It is the
foundation of all other industries. The great railway systems and all manufacturers
are dependent upon the supply of coal. Its use for domestic purposes is now almost
universal. Without coal the wheels of industry are paralyzed and every branch of society must suffer ..... The State is vitally interestedin the operation of her coal mines.6s
The statute does not prevent the operators from making contracts with their employees for digging coal. It does not attempt to dictate the price of labor, or say how
much the operator shall pay. It does not prevent contracts based upon the amount of
lump coal taken from the mine. It simply says that there shall be no fraud or deception
practiced upon the employee as to the amount of coal he has produced. If the mine
runshigh in slack the price can be adjustedaccordingly. The public is too deeply interested in the matter to leave it to the operator to say how coal mines shall be worked. The
State must see 6that there are no unnecessary grounds for friction between employers
and employees.
The assurance of no interference with "price" and with "pay," and the
advice that "friction" is undesirable, were addressed primarily to the
operators. The assertion that the "public" is too deeply interested in the
matter to permit the operator unbridled freedom is, perhaps, but one way
of stating that it is better to acquiesce in a measure that is not actually
harmful to the bulk of coal operators than to risk the possibility of injuring other industries dependent upon the production of coal.
63211 U.S. 539 (19o8).

64Brief for Plaintiff in Error 47.
6

sBrief for Defendant in Error 45.

66Ibid.,

at 47.
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Rail and River Coal Company v. Yaple,67'ivolved a similar statute prohibiting Ohio coal operators from computing miners' pay on the basis of
screened coal. The statute also empowered the Ohio Industrial Commission to ascertain and set the maximum limit of slate, sulphur, and other
impurities to be credited to the average of a car-weight of coal mined. In
the computation of a miner's pay the operator and miner, within this limit,
were free to make any agreement as to the ratio of impurities to the coal
mined. In the absence of such agreement, the Industrial Commission was
empowered to fix and enforce the ratio. The briefs for both the plaintiff
and the defendant in error dealt almost exclusively with the relation of the
statute to the welfare of the operators,with scarcely any mention as to its
effect upon the miners. Counsel for Yaple, defendant in error, seeking to
uphold the constitutionality of the statute, argued thus:
How .... can the employer complain of a law which requires of his employees the
maximum of efficiency? What more efficacious control for his own benefit could he
68
exercise if the law contained no such provision? In what respect is he injured?
Now the orders of6the Industrial Commission .... are manifestly for the protection of the employer. 9
The conclusion irresistibly follows, that if left to themselves on this point, and given
unrestricted "freedom of contract" for their own protection, the operators would not
protect their product but their business would appreciably suffer.7o

The argument of opposing counsel was on the same plane of discoursepointed to the conclusion that the legislation would militate against the
interest of the operators:
It is urged by opposing counsel that these features of the act (which refer to the
fixation of the percentage of impurities by the Industrial Commission) are merely
incidental to the main purpose; that they are intended to prevent some of the evils
to the operator, due to the installation of the mine-run system; that the employee under that system might be tempted to send up from the mine coal containing too much
impurity, or too much fine coal. If, however, the purpose of the regulatoryfeaturesis to
prevent this evil, and thus to protect the operator,then the means employed have absolutely
no relation to the end.?'
Since when has it been considered appropriateto employ the police power of the state
to protect the employer against making unwise contracts?72

The opinion of the Court presented the problem as if it were one in
which concessions were demanded by the miner from the operator:
67

236 U.S. 338 (,915).

68 Brief for Defendant in Error 23.
69Ibid., at 29.
70 Ibid., at 45.

71Brief for Plaintiff in Error 3o .

7' bid.
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The system of mining [prior to the present statute] was regarded as objectionable
by the miners on the ground that they were not paid for mining of a considerable quantity of marketable coal, and there was dissatisfaction because of the wearing of the
screens so as to increase the size of the apertures between bars above the standard.73
In the light of the fact that counsel dealt with the legislation in terms
of its relation to the interest of the operators, it is interesting to note the
evaluation of the case appearing in Commons' History of Labor in the
United States. It was there characterized in terms of a concession to employees:
If the legislature found that the method of payment tended to deprive the employee
of his full wages or was otherwise detrimental to him, it was justified in remedying the
situation by statute. This series of decisions constituted a recognition by the United
States Supreme Court that for the employee, freedom of contract is frequently a legal
fiction and that he may need protection against terms of employment which he himself
agrees to accept-even though health is only remotely involved.74
Workmen's compensation_-The cluster of workmen's compensation
cases, involving the constitutionality of statutes abolishing common law
defenses and creating a system of liability without fault, offers another
interesting chapter in the history of "labor-welfare legislation." The arguments prepared for the Court by counsel opposing the legislation in
76
75
New York Central Railroad v. White, Mountain Timber v. Washington,
and Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen,7 were charged with an intensity
of emotion not present in the cases heretofore discussed. They were warnings to the Court that the collapse of the social order was imminent unless
the Court took proper action. In the first of these cases, for instance, the
argument took the following turn:
The Teutonic empires of Central Europe were pioneers in enactments of this class.
Germany in x884 and Austria in 1887 were among the earliest to pass such laws. Of
the utmost significance is it that in those two countries the theories of Socialism have
attained their furthest political development. There, to a much greater degree than
elsewhere among the powerful nations of the earth, paternalism has circumscribed the
activities of the individual until the whole body politic, outside the governing classes,
stands upon substantially the same level. And that level has been established not by
the elevation of the indolent, inefficient and dependent, but by keeping down the enterprising, capable and self-sustaining.7"
Such legislation is merely the entering wedge for the introduction of a vast and comand River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338, 345 (195).
74 Lescohier and Brandeis, History of Labor in the United States 675 (i935).
73 Rail

75 243

U.S. I88 (x917).

76 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
77

244 U.S. 205 (x917).

78Brief for Plaintiff in Error 4 (italics theirs).
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prehensive scheme of socialistic laws, passed under the guise of regulating the relation
of master and servant in industry, but which have, in effect, as their primary object,
7
the taking of the master's property for the benefit of the servant. 9
It is the familiar instance, which Professor Sumner used to denounce, of a resolution adopted by A and B that C shall have something done for him, not by themselves,
but by D. In other words, the employer is the Forgotten Man whose rights, Sumner
declared, are always overlooked in every ill-conceived plan of social amelioration.o
Compulsory compensation acts are simply professed devices to increase indirectly
the cost of operation to the employer, while in fact they result either in an increase of
wages or in a continuance of wages, in whole or in part, without the necessity of rendering service therefor.5 '
Arguments such as the following, in the Mountain Timber case, suggested
that the legislation in question presaged a development not unsimilar to
that witnessed abroad:
In the early part of the nineteenth century discussion arose among German philosophers as to what should be the relations of the State to its citizens. Such writers as
Fichte and Hegel engaged in the discussion and developed socialist doctrine to a high
degree ..... Following Fichte and Hegel come the socialistic writers, Marx and Lasalle, who developed the paternal idea of government. The first insurance laws sprang
into existence as a counter to socialistic activities of a type so subversive as to become
a source of anxiety to the German government. Bismarck acknowledged himself a
Socialist in the sense of conceding the laborer's right to work and the State's duty to
act wisely, generously and positively for his welfare.12
Counsel arguing for the constitutionality of the legislation in question,
particularly in the Jensen case, urged the Court to discount the dangers
alleged to be lurking in such "socialistic schemes." One way chosen to
convince the Court that the structure of our society was not endangered
was by reference to the experience of other non-socialistic countries
3
throughout the world in abandoning the principle of negligence.
Another way was to assure the court that:
The employer can easily transfer to the customer the necessary pecuniary equivalent of any risk; that, whatever the primary method of placing the burden, the loss,
whether by death or by disablement, will be home eventually not by the working man,
84
but by society; that is, that it will be carriedover into the selling price of the product.
79Ibid.,

at i6.
8o Ibid., at ig.
81 Ibid., at 22.
Reply brief for the Mountain Timber Company 2.
83 It was shown that the negligence principle was abandoned by Austria in 1887, Norway in
1894, Finland in 1895, Great Britain in 1897, Denmark, Italy and France in x898, Spain in
x9oo, Netherlands, Greece and Sweden in 1901, Luxembourg in 1902, Russia and Belgium in
,903, Hungary in 1907, Australia, New Zealand, Transvaal, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and
Peru in x9ii, etc.
84 Brief on behalf of Defendant in Error by the Industrial Accident Commission of CaliS2

fornia 26.

THE LABOR,-WELFARE CASES
The elimination of "economic waste" was also assured.8 s In addition,
"if the employees are relieved from exhaustion, they may give freer and
'86
more efficient service.
In the Mountain Timber case, the assurance to the Court took the following form:
It is designed to promote the general prosperity and to increase the industries of the
state.8 7

The industrial progress of Germany during recent years has been surpassed by that
of no other nation. Prussia was the first European nation to recognize the principle of
the liability of employers in case of industrial accidents regardless of negligence .... ,
with the encouragement of the emperor and his chancellor, Bismarck, a comprehensive
system of workmen's compensation was inaugurated. 88
The language (in Holden v. Hardy) emphasizes the changing attitude of courts
towards social legislation. The change does not involve the change of any constitutional principle, but merely means the shifting of the emphasis from one element to
another.8 9

This last quotation provides a good summation of the nature of the pattern of attack before the Court. It is an argument for judicial tolerance,
based on the theory that "change" which does not harm our basic economic structure does not involve a challenge to the basic principles of the
Constitution.
That the Court was convinced that the employer would not be harmed,
despite the warnings that this legislation constituted a dangerous innovation, is made clear by Mr. Justice Pitney in the White case:
If the employer is left without defense respecting the question of fault, he at the
same time is assured that the recourse is limited and that it goes directly to the relief
of the designated beneficiary. And just as the employee's assumption of ordinary risks
at common law presumably was taken into account in fixing the rate of wages, so the
fixed responsibility of the employer and the modified assumption of risk by the employee under the new system, presunmably will be reflected in the wage scale.9o

Presumably, too, as an "expense of operation," the opportunity for
shifting the cost to the consumer was not without possibility: "This is a
loss arising out of the business, and, however it may be charged up, is an
s Brief on behalf of Defendant in Error by the New York Industrial Commission 25.
6Ibid.
87Brief for Appellees 26.
88
Ibid., at 27. To this could be added the statement of opposing counsel, that such "socialistic" legislation "was accepted by the German government as a means .... to counteract
the discontent of German working classes." Reply brief for Mountain Timber Co. 2.
89 Ibid., at 36.
9o 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
8
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expense of operation, as truly as the cost of repairing broken machinery
9
or other expense that ordinarily is paid by the employer.""
The Court's language in the Mountain Timber case revealed a similar
note of assurance:
Perhaps a word should be said respecting a clause in No. 4 which reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for the employer to deduct or obtain [sic] any part of the premium
required to be by him paid from the wages or earnings of his workmen or any of them,
and the making or attempt to make any such deductions, shall be a gross misdemeanor." If this were to be construed so broadly as to prohibit employers, in agreeing upon
wages and other terms of employment, from taking into consideration the fact that
the employer was a contributor to the state fund, ....it would be open to serious
question whether as thus construed it did not interfere to an unconstitutional extent
with their freedom of contract.92
When Veblen in i9io wrote that "impersonal, collective and limited
liability won its way, as against the system of natural liberty in this field
[Workmen's Compensation] by sheer force of business expediency,"' 93 he
was in fact summarizing the philosophy appearing seven years later in
the arguments before, and judicial opinions of, the Supreme Court in the
White, Jensen, and Mountain Timber cases.
The eight-hour day;--The controversy over the *eight-hour day on
interstate railroads was brought to a head in Wilson v. New. 94 Although
the employees were supposed to benefit as a result of the enactment,
nevertheless, in the arguments, concern over their welfare was in direct
proportion to the efficiency that such welfare would produce for the railroads. Thus the argument for the government urging the Court to uphold
the legislation:
The efficiency and safety of railroad service depend upon the skill and physical
fitness of the employees. It is just as necessary to properly care for the employees as
to keep in good condition the physical instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
91Ibid., at 203.
92 243 U.S. 219, 246 (1917).
93Veblen, op. cit. supra, n. 51 at 280. Note the corroboration of this theory twenty-nine
years later in the language of William Green: "No industries left the state in spite of the fact
that there were states with no compensation laws. Instead, as the law continued in operation,
the employers saw its advantages and now they stand solidly with the workers for the Ohio
Law." Green, Labor and Democracy 26-27 (1939). "Impartial studies show the superiority
of the state fund in lower costfor employers, in freedom from fear of bankruptcy of the fund,

and in greater security for the workers because the state fund has no incentive to cheat the
workers out of payments due them." Ibid. "Employers ....once lined up in opposition ranks
agree that [the] ....Workmen's Compensation Law is a great piece of progressive legislation
which they would not be without." Ibid., at 29. "Those who have been concerned with social
work have seen the disasters of families evicted for non-payment of rent, of overcrowded slum
areas breeding disease as unemployment reduces the family to extremes of poverty. Bitsiness
men know that the unemployed man and hisfamily are poor customers." Ibid., at 63.
94 243 U.S. 332 (1r16).
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Physical efficiency is impossible without proper living conditions which demand suitable food, clothing, housing, rest and recreation.95
Failure to pay fair wages or to fix a fair standard therefor, make slow, costly, unsafe or otherwise inefficient these agencies.96
The hours of service are important to the efficiency of the men. No less is the measure of their compensation. These men are human beings; they have family ties; they
are entitled to time and rest at their homes.The more contented the servant, the better service.97
Rapid transit is called for. All that exists in efficiency must be provided. Service
of the highest class is that which is required. Certainty of performance is no small
part of the duty owed. To obtain all this, it is necessary to have men alert, contented
and willing in the performance of a dangerous occupation. Shorter hours make for
efficiency and competency. The better the servant, the greater his compensation .....
The public is entitled to protection against that inconvenient, delayed and unsafe
method of transportation which may result from unsatisfactory wages or cheap help.g"
The government brief even capitalized on the experience of Henry Ford to
emphasize the benefits resulting from industrial efficiency:
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, said: "A few
weeks ago I had occasion to be in Detroit and there I went through the plant of Mr.
Ford's automobile factory; I had every facility to observe; the manager accompanied
me. I asked him what the result had been of the operation of eight hours a day in his
establishment. He told me this, which he has since written me, and I have incorporated what he said in the September issue of the American Federationist. He said: 'As
compared with the operation of the plant under the ten-hour workday and now since
the introduction of the eight-hour workday, the productive activity of the groups of
men with similar tools, similar groups performing similar work, has increased fully 63
per cent.' You may consult any economist; consult any large employer of labor who
has had the eight-hour day in operation for a series of years, and you will find like
testimony."9
9sBriefs for the United States 24.
97Ibid., at 6i.
96Ibid., at 47.
98Ibid., at 62.
99Ibid., at 77. A striking similarity in the argument is found in Prof. Frankfurter's letter
to the Boston Herald, urging the adoption of the Adamson Act, which the Court in Wilson v.
New upheld: "Experience amply demonstrates that men, women, and children work too long,
from the point of view of the quality of the resulting citizenship. The history of the lowering
of the standards of military requirement, the serious disclosure in England after the Boer War
as to the deterioration of English factory workers, the testimony of General Gorgas-the most
successful health administrator of the world-that poverty, rooted in low wages and long
hours, is the greatest enemy to health, are all there to read for him who wants to be informed.
This is not, however, merely a humanitarian plea; this is not sentimental talk. The experience
of money-making business is, that while an eight-hour day may mean increased labor cost, it
does not mean an increased unit of labor cost. In other words, experience shows that shorter
working hours make for increased production, and therefore more wealth. The apparent paradox is easily explained. Shorter hours result in increased human efficiency, by the reactive
effect on the individual; they also provoke inventiveness, all kinds of savings; they secure the
stoppage of wastes, just because the utmost value must be obtained from the shorter hours.
In a word, they operate as an inducement to greater human competence; they thus increase
money values no less than human values." Reprinted in Frankfurter, Law and Politics 204
et seq (1939).
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The Court evidently reacted favorably to these arguments. Mr. Justice
White, in addition to emphasizing the fact that the congealing of the former wage relationship under the eight-hour standard was temporary, i.e.,
limited to a period of six months, and therefore not as serious a challenge to property rights as the railroads would seem to urge, pointed out
that "the employees on the other hand insisted that as the task would be
unchanged and would be performed in the shorter hours, there would be
no material, or, at all events, no inordinate increase of pay. ' ' °0° That it
could not possibly be a serious threat to the railroads' security is made
more evident by his statement that "the establishment of the eight-hour
standard, since that standard was existing .... on about fifteen per cent
of the railroads, had already been established by Act of Congress as a
basis for work on governmental contracts, and had been upheld by this
Court in sustaining state legislation."' 0'1 Mr. justice McKenna in a concurring opinion had no doubt but that under the act, Congress did not
attempt to regulate wages, but rather left it to the agreement of the parties. The observation was made that "it has never been supposed that
the agitation for an eight-hour day for labor or the legislation which has
responded to it, was intended to fix or did fix the rate of wages to be
paid.))02

Minimum wages for women.-The steps leading up to the sanctioning
of minimum wage legislation in the Parrishcase'03 provide interesting insight into the techniques used by counsel in making this legislation palatable to the Court.
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,10 4 counsel for appellants, urging the
constitutionality of the minimum wage statute for women, argued forcefully that the legislation in question was not adverse to business interests.
Much point was made of the fact that representatives of these interests
offered no serious objections to the measure at the time it was enacted:
No one appeared in opposition to the bill. A remarkable circumstance which has
probably never occurred in any previous legislative hearings on a measure affecting
wage legislation in this country was the appearance of the official organized body of
employers-the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association of the District-who sent
their representative to make a statement indorsing the bill and urging its passage' 0 s
zoo 243 U.S. 332, 356 (1917).

'or Ibid., at 357.

1o bid., at 361. For a penetrating analysis of the Wilson v. New decision, see Kales, op. cit.
o

supra, n. 4 .
103 300 U.S. 379 (1936).
104

261 U.S.

525 (1922).

Mr. Frankfurter was on the brief.
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In brief, it is overwhelmingly clear that unfair depression in the wages of many
women workers has been significantly reduced, without operating adversely to industry and efficiency, and without appreciably diminishing employment for employx °6
ables
But, necessarily, law is intended for and must be judged by its general operation.
And the evidence is overwhelming that the minimum wage laws have made for greater
0 7
stability for business and increased profits.'
In our opinion the favorable action of the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association on this bill is the strongest argument in its favor. This organization is composed
of the representatives of 33 different lines of business, including department stores employing 5,ooo workers, the 12 largest laundries in the District, cigar manufacturers,
etc. After careful consideration of the bill, the secretary of the association was instructed to appear before us and express approval of the measure. This favorable action carries due weight with the committee. Opposition to legislation of this character
would naturally come from employers if they believed that it would jeopardize the
business interests of the community. The Merchants' and Manufacturers' Association
has, on the contrary, gone on record as favoring Senate Bill No. 4548, because they
°
believe it to be a workable measure and that it would tend to benefit business. 8
To this was added thirty pages-headed by the caption, "Industrial Efficiency of Both Employers and Employees Stimulated"-designed to
erase whatever doubts the Court was assumed to have as to the effect
of the legislative enactment upon "business" welfare. 0 9 Again, from the
business viewpoint, the possible danger of the legislation to the marginal
employer was considered. The argument to the Court on this issue emphasized the desirability of safeguarding the interests of the efficient and
far-sighted business man." ° It was argued that to permit unlimited freedom to the inefficient marginal employers would hinder the efficient operators of business enterprise:
No industry which fails to supply even the bare minimum living requirements of
its own workers can possibly be sound. Such an industry, instead of aiding in the work
of supporting life, can be only a burden upon it by precisely the amount of subsidy
which it drains from other industries. The fundamental policy represented by this
Act is the stimulation of individual enterprise, the prevention of taxation upon sound
industries for the artificial support of unsound ones. The aim it encourages is to make
industries self-supporting."'
xo6

Ibid., at xiii.

107

Ibid., at liv.

Xo8
Ibid., at 41.

Xo9
The argument that higher wages will result in greater industrial efficiency is the thesis
also of Hobson in The Evolution of Modem Capitalism (igio). See particularly at 355-76.
-10 See Prof. Beard's comments to the effect that "it is true that minimum wage legislation
affected mainly small employers, the owners of laundries, petty concerns, sweatshops; that it
touched adversely few powerful business interests." Beard, America in Midpassage 286 (1939).
il Brief for Appellants xlix.
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The Court was not convinced, however, that the regulation would not
harm industrial enterprise. In its rejection of the legislation it made clear
what the Court expected in the "labor-welfare" cases:
[The statute] compels [the employer] to pay at least the sum fixed in any event, because the employee needs it, but requires no service of equivalent value from the employee. It therefore undertakes to solve but one-half of the problem. The other half
is the establishment of a corresponding standard of efficiency, and this forms no part
of the policy of the legislation, although in practice the former half without the latter
must lead to ultimate failure, in accordance with the inexorable law that no one can
continue indefinitely to take out more than he puts in without ultimately exhausting
the supply.-'2

In this brief statement is contained the nub of the arguments which
counsel have developed in these cases. Inherent in this statement is the
assumption that such legislation has little chance of validation if the Court
is of the opinion that the benefits will accrue to the employees alone. If,
as in Muller v. Oregon, "a corresponding standard of efficiency" in work
can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court, then the legislation
has an opportunity to survive.
Murphy v. SardelllW3 brought the minimum wage issue again before the
Supreme Court. The brief filed in behalf of the Industrial Commission of
California was significant. It in effect warned the Court that unless a
more flexible construction were placed upon the fourteenth amendment
than was permitted in the Adkins case, resort would have to be made to
extra-constitutional means:
If the framework of the American government, and particularly the fourteenth
amendment, ceases to expand with the growth of the country, a rupture of the constitutional fabric sooner or later by means other than judicial is inevitable. Has the fourteenth amendment lost capacity for further growth by construction to meet new conditions as these arise? Does not the decision in the Adkins case, reviving as it does the
doctrine of the supposedly overruled Lochner case tend towards this result?"4

Such inflexibility, it was argued, was certainly not warranted, especially
in view of the fact that the legislation was beneficial to industry. Rather
than being harmful to the employer,
The payment of higher wages enables the employer to secure a better grade of labor
and increased production. Less than fair living wages produces undernourishment, illhealth, discouragement and retardation of physical and mental processes. An increased
"1 261 U.S. 521, 557 (1922).
113 269 U.S. 530 (1925). This was a memorandum decision affirming the District Court
"upon the authority of Adkins v. Children's Hospital."
ZX4
Brief of Amicus Curiae on behalf of the Industrial Commission of California for Plaintiff
in Error 56.
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wage stimulates competition for employment and greater production of workers, and
opens to the employer a higher quality of labor from which to choose. Though some
employers are slow to realize it, the cheapest is the least efficient in the long run."s
The additional burden upon the employer may be counterbalanced by the increased
efficiency of labor produced by the amelioration of evils under which the workman
suffers, and does not disturb the balance of wages to service to any greater extent than
6
approved regulations of other terms of contract."
The brief continued to emphasize the harmlessness of the regulation
to industry:
The value to the employer of the labor is measured in part by the improvement of
the product created by the laborer and in part by the price at which the product can
be sold. The minimum wage operates uniformly upon all members of the industry
affected and the increasein wages is therefore passed on to the consumer by being added to
the cost of production like any other uniform increase in operating cost. The law itself
adds to the value of the product in effect an amount sufficient to raise the fair value
of the worker's services to a minimum necessary for his subsistence and the minimum
wage becomes the minimum fair value."17

These arguments are important in revealing a significant attitude
toward the Court in its dealings with measures touching upon a sensitive
nerve of our industrial society. Implicit in them is the assumption that
legislation purporting to benefit employees must be justified by showing
that the cost of such benefits will be shifted to shoulders other than those
of the employers, or that the employers themselves will benefit from the
measure.
8
In Morehead v. Tipaldo,"1
counsel wanted to make it clear at the outset
that this measure was quite different from that considered in the Adkins
case. They stressed the fact that it contained an additional standardone which would assure the employer that no wage would be set which
was not commensurate with the value of the services rendered:

The "fair wage" [as a standard in the statute in the Tipaldo case] means a wage
fairly and reasonablycommensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered.
This definition obviously does not contemplate the "cost of living" as a factor (as in the
Adkins case) ..... The fair minimum wage, by its very definition and method of calculation, can never exceed the reasonable value of services rendered.9
The statute does not interfere with the payment of a wage that represents the fair
value of the services rendered, even if it be lower than the minimum cost of health subsistence. In fact, that is precisely the question at bar. Obviously, the object was to
demonstrate to the Court that the statute in question represented a shift from an em20
ployee standard of "cost of living" to an employer standard of "value of service.'1
-sIbid., at 52.
"6Ibid.
17 Ibid., at 70.

'8 298 U.S. 587 (1935).
I9 Appellant's brief on the law ii.
120 Ibid., at X2.
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Counsel continued in the same vein, showing the necessity of preserving
a plane of "fair" competition in businesses employing women as laborers.
The emphasis upon employee welfare was subdued:
The immediate end is the establishment of a wage for women and minors which is
reasonably and fairly commensurate with the value of the services rendered. The
Legislature, in addition, by means of a minimum wage, endeavored to protect industry
from the evils of unfair competition which undoubtedly accompany the exploitation of employees by the least conscionable group of employers. No one can quarrel with the legitimacy of the ends sought.Y'
The legislative determination to attempt, by means of the minimum wage, to protect industry from one source of unfair competition, has a large and familiar foundation in such statutes as the Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton Act, and the
Interstate Commerce Act. These statutes all have as their purpose the elimination
of unfair competitive tactics. An employer who regularly pays less than a "fair wage"
would have a definite and unfair advantage over his less grasping competitor were it
not for the equalizing effect of such a statute ..... The New York statute involved
in the case of Nebbia v. People, supra,is another example of judicial approval of a
statute designed to prevent unfair competition and thus assist and indeed save industry.-'
To give assurance to the Court that the proposed legislation had the support of the industrial groups involved, the brief pointed out that:
In the instant case, "fair minimum wage" has been unanimously approved and determined by representatives of the laundry industry, as well as by representatives of the
public and the workers. No protest has been heard as to its fairness in the public
hearings, and none was made in arguments below.-3
That the industry was well able to absorb the wage increaseseffected by the mandatory
order is seen from thefact that 9 4 per cent of laundries throughoutthe State were complying
with the terms of the mandatory order in November, 1935; 58 per cent were paying more
than half their women and minor employees wages higher than the established minimum
rates.124

The same emphasis was apparent in the special brief prepared for the
warden, Tipaldo, the petitioner in the controversy:
The Legislature, in addition, by means of a minimum wage, endeavored to protect
industry from the evils of unfair competition which accompany the exploitation of employees by the least conscionable group of employers. An employer who regularlypays
less than a "fairwage" would have a definite and unfair advantage over his less grasping
25
competitor were it not for the equalizing effect of such a statute.
The purpose of the statute in the Adkins case was to guarantee a wage based solely
upon the necessities of the workers, without regard to earningpower. It applied to all vocations. It was exclusively a price-fixing statute, with the "vague variable standard"
121

Ibid., at x7.

12

Ibid., at

12S

Argument for the Warden, 298 U.S. 587, 589 (1935).

20.

X"'Ibid., at 13.
241bid., at 47.
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of the "cost of living," with no relationship between the wage set and the work done.
6
It did not consider the industry's ability to pay.12

Mr. Justice Butler's opinion was in effect a holding that the "fair

value of the services" standard was inoperative, and that the presence of
the other standard, i.e., "less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost
of living necessary for health," was too much of a threat to the security
of the business groups involved.127 The opinion quoted with approval the
statement in the Adkins case to the effect that

......

the declared basis

is not the value of the service rendered but the extraneous circumstance
that the employee needs to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her
2
subsistence, health and morals."X
To both Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote dissenting opinions, this was an unduly strained construction of the legislation. The Chief Justice recognized, among other things, that "the constant lowering of wages by unscrupulous employers reduces the purchasing power of the workers and threatens the stabilityof the industry, ' '1 29and
that it was the unconscionable, inefficient employer against whom the
regulation was intended.130 Mr. Justice Stone took cognizance of the fact
that "a wage insufficient to support the worker does not visit its consequence upon him alone; that it may affect profoundly the entire economic
structure of society ....,,3, To Mr. Justice Stone, the regulation was

merely a requirement that "industry ....bear the subsistence cost of
the labor which it employs... . ,,'32an argument that won the approval of both the Court and industrial leaders in the Workmen's Com33
pensation cases.'

In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,34 a minimum wage statute identical
Ibid., at

12

592-93.

127Interestingly enough, the opinion quotes the following from the "factual background"
of the Act in question: "In the absence of any effective minimum fair wage rates for women
and minors, the constant lowering of wages by unscrupulous employers constitutes a serious
form of unfair competition against other employers, reduces the purchasing power of the workers (a large proportion of the population of the state), and threatens the stability of industry."
298 U.S. 587, 616 (x935). But this did not soften the conviction that the legislation was "arbitrary."
'28 298 U.S. 587, 612 (1935).

Ibid., at 626.
at 631.
13! Ibid., at 635.
X29

130Ibid.,

3

Ibid.

See the analysis of the arguments in New York Central Railway v. White, and Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, etc., stressing the fact that these costs are ultimately to be shifted
to the consumer, supra, at notes 75 et seq.
134 300 U.S. 379 (1936)"'
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with the one invalidated in the Adkins case was before the Court. Here
the standard, unlike the one in the Tipaldo case, was merely the "minimum cost of living necessary to health." There was no additional safeguard of "fair value of the services." The brief filed by the Attorney General for the State of Washington had at least one major object in viewthat of pointing out to the Court that there was no showing on the part
of the employer involved that any hardship or harm had been suffered
by him.15 Counsel for the hotel, with the weight of the Tipaldo case behind them, simply assured the Court that, inasmuch as the minimum wage
might be established without regard to the value of the services rendered,
"it condemns it beyond question,"'' 36 and was therefore void on its face.
The Court's reversal of the Adkins holding was in effect a recognition
that the apprehension over the injury to business was unfounded. Mr.
Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, agreed with the amicus curiae
that there was no showing that the employer in the immediate case was
harmed.T37 It was pointed out that, despite the fact that the statute in
question was identical with the one challenged in the Adkins case (i.e.,
utilized as a standard the minimum cost of living necessary to health), it
was "safe to assume that women will not be employed at even the lowest
wages allowed unless they earn them, or unless the employer's business can
sustain the burden."'I 38 "The legislature," the opinion continued, -"was
entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of the 'sweating system,'
the exploitation of workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the
bare cost of living, thus making their very helplessness the occasion of a most
injuriouscompetiton."39 In this latter statement can be seen the adoption
of the argument of counsel in the Tipaldo case urging the validation of the
statute on the ground that it would "protect industry from the evils of
unfair competition which accompany the exploitation of employees by the
least conscionable group of employers.".40
'3s Brief of amicus curiae (State of Washington) 23.
136 Answer of appellant to the brief of amicus curiae 6.
1.7 300 U.S. 379, 386 (r936).

138 Ibid., at 397.
'39 Ibid.,

at 398.

Supra n. 121, at 89. Compare Millis and Montgomery, Labor's Progress and Some Basic
Labor Problems 280 (1938): "the minimum wage movement has had underlying it the assumption that. ... concentration of production within those firms able to pay decent wages would
not be undesirable. In industries where comparatively little capital is necessary to start a smallscale establishment, a large number of irresponsible, 'fly-by-night' firms are chronically to be
found-firms whose chief source of survival capacity is low labor cost. If minimum wage legislation pushes these firms across the marginal line and production is concentrated in a smaller
number of larger and more efficient plants, the result to be expected would be a higher wage
140
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The labor injumtion.-"The most significant instance of the use of the
injunction by labor"'' 4 is the characterization that has been ascribed to
the famous Railway Brotherhood case in 1929.142 In this controversy the
labor organization sought and obtained an injunction restraining a railroad from using a company union as an instrument for employee control.
The philosophy which underlay the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was particularly embodied in the brief presented for the Brotherhood by Donald
Richberg and John Crooke. Their evaluation of the Act was principally
in terms of its effect upon the efficiency and welfare of the railroads. The
elaboration of the benefits to the railroad employees resulting from"selforganization" was not considered essential for its justification. They, for
instance, cited from Director General Hines's work, War History of the
American Railroads:
Any studied consideration of this matter must lead to the conclusion that despite
the numerous reasons why the productiveness of railroad employees might easily have
been greatly impaired during Federal Control, the general average of railroad efficiency
in that period makes an extremely favorable comparison with pre-war efficiency and
compares with post-war efficiency fully as well as does industrial war-time efficiency
with post-war efficiencyZ43
The brief made special note of the aquiescence by the National Industrial
Conference Board in the principle of employee self-organization. Before
the Court, therefore, there was evidence of a respected industrial spokesman's confidence that to permit employees to organize in bargaining
groups without interference or restraint would not militate against the
interests of the employer:
American doctrine authoritatively stated by the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission with the approval of representatives of both employers and unions included in its
bill for the entire industry without necessarily higher-or at least without proportionately
higher--cost per unit of product." "Other consequences of minimum wage legislation in this
country can be summarized with a fair degree of definiteness ..... That fair employers were
protected against the competition of 'shoestring capitalists' who continually attempted to cut
costs by depressing wages, is evidenced by the change of attitude on the part of the majority
of employers. Originally the majority were bitterly opposed to this type of state interference,
but experience demonstrated to them-as it had in Australia and England-the benefits of a
standardized minimum wage. The 'shoestringers' remained enemies of the legal minimum
wage, but there is abundant evidence that the more responsible employers came to favor the
plan. There is little evidence that business has been injured, and probably the minimum wage
has had only limited effect in starving out marginal or submarginal producers and in forcing
mechanization of industry." Ibid., at 314.
'4,

Frankfurter and Green, The Labor Injunction 110 (1930).

281 U.S. 548 (1929). Although this case does not come within the category of the laborwelfare "enactments," it nevertheless furnishes additional corroborative data in support of the
general thesis of this paper.
243 Brief for Respondent 29.
242
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membership and commended as the basis of industrial adjustments by Presidents
Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson: That no person shall be refused employment or in any way
discriminatedagainst on account of membership or non-membership in any labor organization.
It should be again emphasized that the foregoing was the recommendation made by an
outstanding,national and tharoughly representative organization of employers.'44

Additional assurance was provided by reference to the reports of Congressional committees on the Railway Labor Act of 1926:
The reports of the committees of both houses of Congress laid emphasis on the
fact that the bill (for the Railway Labor Act of 1926) under consideration represented
the agreement of railway managements operating over 8o per cent of the railway
mileage and railroad organizations representing an overwhelming majority of the railroad employees (House Report on H.R. 9463). The Senate Report stated that when the
bill was submitted to a meeting of the Association of Railway Executives, 52 roads representing 167,915 miles favored it; 20 roads representing 36,564 miles opposed it; 3 2 roads
representingx8,134 miles were absent.4s

The Court's reaction to these arguments was favorable. Although the
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes recognized "that employees are entitled
to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to
promote agreements with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work,"'1 46 nevertheless, it was made clear that this did not prohibit
the "exercise of the right of the carrier to select its employees or to disx
charge them.'
Prison labor.-In Whitfield v. Ohio,' 48 the Court had under consideration the Federal Hawkes-Cooper Act and an Ohio statute, the effect of
both being to prohibit the sale in the Ohio open market of goods manufactured in the prisons of other states. The decision of the Court upholding
the legislation was couched in terms of benefit to "free labor":
The view of the State of Ohio that the sale of convict-made goods in competition
with the products of free labor is an evil, finds .... support in fact and in the similar
legislation of a preponderant number of other states ..... All such legislation, state
and federal, proceeds upon the view that free labor, properly compensated, cannot
compete successfully with the enforced and underpaid convict labor of the prison.' 49

Emphasis in the brief for the State of Ohio, however, was upon the
serious competition faced by Ohio manufacturers operating with "regular" labor.
Ibid., at 3o.
Ibid., at 36 (italics supplied only in second paragraph).
146 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1929).
X4'297 U.S. 431 (1935).
244
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The following is indicative of this approach:
Indeed, the inevitable result of the situation confronting the state would be to enable the prisons and their agents or distributors to so concentrate in their own hands
the production and sale in the general markets of particular commodities, thereby driving out of business the legitimate manufacturer of similar articles ..... For it cannot be
challenged that certain prisons were rapidly approaching the position of sole producers
of certain commodities previously produced by independent manufacturers. The facts
were not mere accidental developments, but were dearly the result of the freedom from
restriction which prison-made commodities enjoyed.
There was grave danget that they [might], if left uncontrolledandfree from the rules of
normal trade, dominate the entire business of the country in any commodity as they have
already done wih respect to some commodities. If they can threaten the general welfare
and prosperity of a state by the destruction of private industry with regard to twine,
shirts, brooms, stoves, hollow-ware, etc., what is to prevent their invasion of any commercialfield?,so

The controversy over the prohibition of prison-made goods through the
channels of interstate commerce was again presented to the Court in the
Kentucky Whip and Collar case.' 5' Here, as in the Whitfield case, although
concern was shown for the preservation of "freedom of labor,s12 the briefs
of counsel urging the Court to uphold the legislation demonstrated again
what the continuance of prison-made goods in the market would mean to
private manufacturers, who still produced the bulk of the commodities.
The brief for the State of New York made constant use of such phrases as

"public welfare" and "general welfare."'X3 The brief for the federal government referred to the fact that "if convict labor is hired from the state
by a private contractor who sells the products of that labor on the open
market, the contractor receives what amounts to a subsidy, because labor,

and other factors of production, are furnished at less than cost to private
industry."'"54

The brief for the American Federation of Labor, also as amicus curiae,
was even more clear in formulating this attitude:
More than ig million work shirts (as against 13 million 8oo in 1923) were manufactured in prisons and sold in open market in i932 in competition with approximately
62 million work shirts made by free labor; 7 million pairs of pants were produced in
Xso
Brief for Respondent

62.

's' 299 U.S. 334 (1936).
The Whitfield case was concerned with a Congressional act which
made convict goods transported to a state subject to the operation of state laws, despite arrival
in the "original package." The immediate case was concerned with a Congressional act which
outlawed the shipment of convict goods before arrival in the states.
"'2Again, as in the Whitfield case, the Court made reference to the fact that "Congress in
exercising the power confided to it by the Constitution is as free as the states to recognize the
fundamental interests of free labor." Ibid., at 352.
's3 Brief of the State of New York as amicus curiae 7, Mi.
X54bid., at zo.
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prisons and sold upon the open market in competition with 27 million pairs of work
pants made in private factories and, in addition, some 64o,ooo pairs of overalls were
produced in prison factories during the same period.iss
[The President appointed a special committee to investigate the relation between
the competition of the products of prison labor with the products of the cotton garment
industry:] This committee on November 26, 1934, made public its report, after a
thorough investigation of the effect of the sale in the commerce of the United States
of convict-made goods. The Committee in its conclusions stated: "It has been impossible in the past for the industry to achieve stability, to improve its standards, because
of the lower costs of prison manufacture. The prison manufacturer had the advantages
zS6
of free rent, light, and heat, of low labor costs, and of a controlled labor force."'

Unemployment compensation.--The arguments over the constitutionality of the New York Unemployment Compensation Act 3 7 afford additional insight into the social values to which counsel in the labor-welfare cases
made their appeal. Counsel for those urging the invalidation of the act,
interestingly enough, characterized the approach of the opposition as one
in which it was assumed that "labor, like plant and machinery, is a chattel
owned and controlled by employers."'1 8 The brief for the State of New
York carried strong assurances that industry would be the actual beneficiary of the legislation. It contained quite a painstaking demonstration of
the fact that "labor" is a cost, which can be shifted to the consuming public,
and at the same time result in greater industrial efficiency and greater
profits:
The economic effect of a tax on payrolls to be paid by employers is obviously to increase their costs of production. An increase in wage or interest rates, higher prices for
raw materials, or any other increase in costs of production would have the same immediate effect. Other changes in costs, approaching or even exceeding in size the maximum mmediate cost of this payroll tax, continually take place in the different stages
of the business cycle. In general, the reaction of employers to increased costs of doing
business is always the same; they try to pass on the increase to consumers through
higher prices or they attempt to recoup by reducing their expenses. Consequently, it
is to be expected that the payroll tax will immediately induce employers to try either
one or both methods of adjustment. When employers find that prices can be increased
without a proportionate decline in the volume of sales, the increased cost will usually
be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.-9
If this course is not open, adjustments in expenses will be attempted which may
take the direction of the elimination of uneconomical practices, the introduction of
technological improvements, which would require less expenditurefor labor, in the fu'ss Brief of the American Federation of Labor as amicus curiae 8.
iS6 Ibid., at 9.
s7 Chamberlin v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (I934). This was a per curiam decision upholding
the validity of the legislation.
XsBrief for the Appellants 57.
"s9 Economic Brief of Appellees 129.
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ture, or a reduction in the wage which is offered to applicants for jobs. In some cases,
employers may find it more economical to absorb all or part of the additional cost
rather than to attempt to pass it on, but it is reasonable to suppose that they will adopt
this course only as a last resort. It is unlikely that a small uniform levy on payrolls
alone will offer more of an obstacle to business men than they are in the habit of meeting in the every day struggle to remain in business. The exact procedure by which the
adjustment is made and the length of time required to make it will vary with the economic conditions in each industry. Since the cost and market conditions are subject
to continual change, it is impossible to predict accurately what the precise outcome
will be in each particular case, but it is the consensus of opinion that in most cases the
cost will ultinhately be shifted. 60
A hypothetical argument is sometimes advanced that the payroll tax will be paid by
buyers out of their profits and that a contribution rate of only three (3) per cent of payrolls will amount to a much larger sum in terms of net earnings. Such comparisons are
invalid. Of necessity, they relate the estimated amount of contributions to the past
profits of concerns before the imposition of the tax (although profits, being a residuum,
are the net outcome of a given past combination of income and cost factors) and assume
that none of the cost would have been shifted. We are then led to believe that the payroll
tax is really confiscatory because it will amount to a large proportion of profits. The
fallacy of such an argument is apparent.''
Finally, it should be emphasized that the incidence of the tax falls upon the employer only in the first instance. As the Economic Brief demonstrates, ultimately the
greater share of the cost will be shifted either to wage earners, in the form of lower
wages, or to consumers, in the form of higher prices [Ec. Br., pp. 129-34]. Thus, in
the end the cost will be borne not by industry alone, but by the whole community.
This was pointed out by Judge Crane, writing for the majority in the Court below:
"Instead of solely taxing all the people directly, it has passed a law whereby employers are taxed for the help of the unemployed, the sums thus paid being cast upon
the public generally through the natural increase in the prices of commodities. Whether relief under this new law of the Legislature or under the dole system, the public at
6
large pays the bill.' '

The "business man's" standard was, of course, also adopted by counsel
for the opposition:
Besides taking no account of differences in unemployment due to differing conditions inherent in different businesses, the statute takes no account of differences in
the efforts and competence of particular businessmen ..... Under this statute the appellant, Associated Industries, which has a "record of substantially no unemployment
experience for more than fifteen years last past," is more onerously burdened by the
exactions of this statute than the business of the same size which is run spasmodically,
and with a large labor turnover.' 63
The statute does [not] make any distinction between businesses which areprofitable
because of good management and those which are failing because of incompetence of
management or obsolescence or other defect of product., 64
16o Ibid.
"'TIbid.
x62 Brief for Defendant in Error 32.

163 Brief

for Appellants 38.
x64
Ibid., at 40.
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Here, dearly, is a plan wholly arbitrary on its face. Here, clearly, is gross and confessed discrimination.16 s
Instead of placing the greatest burden, and hence the greatest inducement to correction, upon those employers following methods resulting in the largest and most pronounced unemployment, it does precisely the opposite and increases the burden of the
employer who increases or stabilizes employment, and decreases the burden of the emx66
ployer who cuts employment or who follows spasmodic methods of operation.
Here the employer is compelled to contribute to the support of total strangers, and
the weight of his contribution is not measured by the amount of his own unemployment or of that in his industry or industrial group. He is compelled to contribute even
though he never has any unemployment, and the burden of his contributions increases
in direct ratio to his success in eliminating unemployment. 6
Collective bargaining.-Thetensile strength of the collective bargaining
provisions of the Railway Labor Act was tested by the Supreme Court in
the VirginianRailway case.68 Briefly, the major issue was whether the
injunctive process could be used to compel the railway management to
confer or "treat with" representatives of the employees during a period of
industrial strife. Not only questions of interpretation of the statute were
involved, but considerations of constitutionality as well. Counsel for the
railroad argued, of course, that the device chosen by Congress to regulate
industrial disputes was violative of property rights. Counsel for the Federation attempted to demonstrate that, whatever benefit the employees
derived, the primary purpose of the Railway Labor Act provisions was not
to destroy or curtail rights of "property," but rather to safeguard and insure them:
Congress has sought to minimize or eliminate these losses through a long course of
legislation whose basic purpose has been and is to provide the means whereby these
labor disputes may be settled before they attain proportionssufficient to jeopardize the
carrying on of the commercial process. 69 In dealing with numerous employees scattered
over the many miles of a railroad's system it has been considered necessary by carriers
that they negotiate general agreements defining the rights of whole classes or crafts of
employees as units. If a carrier is prevented from treating with regard to the negotiations of such agreements with other parties, its own economic self-interest dictates that
it treat for that purpose with the certified representative of the employees.170
The Railway Transportation Act of 1920 marked, as this Court said in the New
England Division Case (261 U.S. 184), a change from a prohibitory attitude of the
Government toward the railroads to an affirmative effort to help the roads and to help
the conditions that might interfere with the continuity of transportation.7'
Speaking first of the affirmative part of the decree requiring collective bargaining,
we do not see that there is any deprivation of liberty or property by requiring merely
6
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negotiation and collective bargaining without a requirement of an ultimate conclusion or
agreement. From the point of view of the petitioners, the contention must be that
merely to require an employer to sit at the same table with his employees and to enter
into business negotiation with persons with whom he does not care to is a deprivation
of liberty or a deprivation of right of property that is forbidden by the Constitution of
the United States. Of course, the employer has the right to operate his business free of
dictation. There is neither disposition to, nor authority or reasonfor raising any question
as to that right172
Froma simple railroadoperatingstandpoint,it would be quite impracticable for two
groups, majority and minority of the same craft or class of employees, jointly constituing one operating or service organization, to function efficiently under two divergent
sets of labor rules ..... The accounting complications arising in themselves would be
expensive. The majority and minority employees would become known, with the result, considering the controversial nature of the situation as a whole, that all kinds of
disturbances growing out of proselyting [sic] and favoritism would ensue to impair
the morale of the labor forces.'"
It has been the experience in the past that interstate commerce is subject to delays
and interruptions which have their source in disputes between carriers and employees,
members of the public. Congress has sought to minimize or eliminate these losses
through a long course of legislation whose basic purpose has been and is to provide
the means whereby these labor disputes may be settled before they attain proportions
sufficient to jeopardize the carrying on of the commercial process.774

The safeguarding of the "commercial process" by elimination of the hazards of industrial peace was also the basis upon which the Court found justification for sanctioning the collective bargaining machinery under the
act. Mr. Justice Stone pointed out:
Experience had shown, before the amendment of z934, that when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to represent the employees, and when there
was willingness of the employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their
grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally followed and strikes had
been avoided. On the other hand, a prolific source of dispute had been the maintenance
by the railroads of company unions and the denial by railway management of the authority of representatives chosen by their employeesX7S
Where the obstruction of the company union is removed, the meeting of employers
and employees at the conference table is a powerful aid to industrial peace.'7 6

The arguments in the cases involving the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act add much to the articulateness of the "laborwelfare" cases. In the oral argument in the Jones-Laughlin case, 77 Mr.
Stanley Reed, for the Government, made it clear that the primary purpose of the act was not to regulate labor:
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I do, however, wish to make this comment-that collective bargaining is not the
ultimate end of this act. It is phrased, of course, as a regulation of commerce. It is,
from our point of view, a regulation of commerce. It deals with labor relations as they
8
directly affect commerce.77
Well, if we were undertaking to defend this act on the ground that Congress had
the power to regulate labor conditions as such, I would fully agree with what Your
Honor has said, but our contention is that Congress is not undertaking to regulate labor conditions as such; that it is undertaking to protect interstate commerce from situations that develop from those labor conditions, and that the causes which lead to
these strikes with intent, and to strikes with the necessary effect, to interfere with interstate commerce are within the regulatory power of Congress.179
Its major purpose, so it was maintained, was to safeguard commercial
enterprise and industry:
Of course, the Court is thoroughly familiar with the seriousness of the strike situation. We might expect that because we have a serious situation we would find that the
,Government has power to provide a remedy. We need to go farther than that. Consequently, there has been a long continued interest of the Federal Government in the
strike situation, and in the industrial situation as a whole, that reaches back to the
Industrial Commission of r898 and comes on down to the National Industry Recovery
Act. A typical result of those continuous investigations will be found on page 65 of
our brief, where we refer to the report of the President's Industrial Conference of 1918.
All of these matters were before Congress. Not only were members of Congress as
familiar as we are with the constant research and investigation into the strike situation, but they held prolonged hearings in which they discussed the problem of the
strike, its effect upon the industry and the commerce of the country and the steps which
might be taken to remedy the situation.o
. It is our view that the interferences with the rights of employers which are implicit
in this act are interferences which, under the doctrine of due process so frequently dedared by this Court, are reasonable and proper in their character and are not capricious. They are aimed at a situation which is within the power of Congress to control
in protecting the commerce of the country from these recurring and huge dislocations
arising from the various strikes that afflict the Nation.j8'
The paralyzing effect on the Interstate Commerce industrial disputes in enterprises similar to that of respondent is a matter of common knowledge. A strike or lockout ordinarilymeans the complete cessation of business. No materials flow in; no finished
products flow out. Effects are immediately felt in other enterprises dependent upon
the plant where the dispute occurs for their materials or semi-finished parts. The markets are disrupted; no business commitments can be made.'82
The pages of Iron Age, the standard business publication of industry, reveal the
effect of the dispute upon the iron and steel mill operations and the market. In the
issue of Sept. 22,
9ig,published three days after the strike began, it was reported
that the "general effect" of the strike "was to paralyze the iron and steel market."
Not knowing just what they had to face, some mills directed their representatives to
178 Oral argument of Petitioner i8.
X79Ibid., at 120.
181 Ibid., at 13o.
"80 Ibid.
182 Brief for the N.L.R.B. 21.
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cease taking orders and under no circumstances to promise definite deliveries against
contracts or specifications.',3
The particular industry here is a striking example of recurring labor difficulties.
The great steel strike of i919 and 1920 is still fresh in our minds with the stoppage of
transportation; the stoppage of production of steel and iron; and the inability of the
factories and industries which depended upon the steel industry for their raw materials
8
to draw from their usual source of supply. 4
Here we feel that this act is brought forward for the purpose of protecting, just as
directly, that great commerce from the interruptions of labor activities and controversies which have caused losses of staggering amounts, which of course have an effect
upon commerce enormous in its magnitude and in its difficulties, and which we believe
are sufficiently within the connotation of the word "direct" to justify this Court in
reversing the decision of this case.18s
It was also made clear that whatever rights the Act will accord to labor
will not impair the "natural rights" of the employer:
We leave the employer all the natural rights which he needs to regulate and operate
his business. He is not forbidden to discharge an employee. He is forbidden to discharge him [for] only one thing--his labor relations. The employer has great powers,
of course. The employee has been permitted, and I believe that this Court has approved, unionization and collective bargaining and ordinary labor activities. The
workman has been found to have rights-rights of organization to protect himself
against the overwhelming material force of the employer. To ask the employer to
give up but a trifle of the power which he has, to compel him to keep his hands from
the labor organizations of his workmen, is, in our view, not a deprivation of any liberty
or property which is beyond a reasonable interpretation of due process., 6
The arguments of counsel for the Jones-Laughlin Steel Corporation
further illustrate the nature of the issue before the court.
Now it cannot be said that Congress in the Norris-LaGuardia Act was trying to
prevent the interruption of commerce by strikes, nor in [the] Bankruptcy Act. The real
purpose of Congress, as shown by the attempt to hitch those matters onto the Norris-LaGuardia Act was that Congress was trying to regulate labor relations, and that is what they
are trying to do here, and it is merely a matter of verbiage to try to hitch on to them
the theory that it is really to remove obstructions to commerce.
Did that indicate a purpose on the part of Congress to free commerce from obstruction? Nothing of the kind. It indicates the congressional purpose to force national
unions upon industry, and the act is sweeping in its language. It purports to cover all
industry, and it is exactly what was intended. 117
In the Friedman-Marks case' 88 the arguments were also keyed to the
problem of the effect of the legislation upon industry. Counsel for respondent proceeded in the following vein:
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Over our objection .... the Board admitted into evidence and based its decisions
upon-and we have noted our exceptions to that-the most amazing mass of testimony that can be conceived within 4oo printed pages. I shall not labor the argument
by detailing that testimony. Some of it has been referred to in other cases, some of
the same kind of testimony, but it contained opinions of statisticians, of economists,
of officers of union affiliations, of labor managers, and others, with respect to-not a
thing with respect to what went on in our plant, not a thing with respect to how we
produced or shipped our merchandise--and we have reserved our exceptions to every
bit of this in the record-but with respect to the manufacture and distribution of
men's clothing generally, opinions, as to the validity of this act, as to the value of collective bargaining, testimony by Mr. Hillman, the president of the union, and letters
from President Roosevelt congratulating him upon what he had done for industry and
what he was doing for the N.I.R.A., references by him and others to the fact that even
a justice-and they made a great point of it-that one of the Justices of this Court had
sat as an arbitrator in a labor dispute in some other industry, and discussions by great
economists as to the evils flowing from the inequality of wages and working hours in
all kinds of industries not related to us and not related particularly even to this in8
dustry.X9
And of course I shall not stop to argue that we think that that decision that we cannot discharge is tantamount to depriving the employer, .... of all control in its management of its labor relations and of its internal business, in the promotion and the disciplining and the demoting of its employees, and substitutes the management of this
National'Labor Relations Board for the management of this company. 90
The government brief emphasized the fact that the experience of industrial leaders confirms the notion that collective bargaining is beneficial to industry:
In the period from I9IO to the present time the industry has been characterized by
the gradual acceptance of the procedure of collective bargaining. The Chicago area,
for example, suffered from constant labor controversies; only one firm, that of HartSchaffner and Marx, which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 1911
which had been continued to the present time, escaped strikes and lockouts. However,
in igig the remainder of the industry in that area entered into an agreement recognizing the rights of organization and collective bargaining similar to the existing agreement with Hart-Schaffner and Marx. As a result, the burdens upon commerce resulting from industrial strife have been eliminated in that area.' 9'
In the Associated Press case,' 9' counsel for the government again proceeded to demonstrate the fact that enlightened industrial leaders have
found collective bargaining beneficial to industry:
The application of the principles of freedom of organization, freedom of association,
and freedom of representation, has been consistently recommended by every commission of inquiry which has considered the problem.93
189 Oral argument on behalf of Friedman-Harry Marks Co. 165.
'9, Brief for the Government 16(f) 7.
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193 Oral Arguriient on behalf of the N.L.R.B. 8o.

THE LABOR-WELFARE CASES
More recently, in 1934, a Federal commission of inquiry headed by Governor
Winant has recommended the same course, and ....experts engaged by the Commonwealth Fund have come to the same conclusion.194
These principles have been and can be applied outside of the railroad industry.
Your Honors will recall that during the period of the war [the] co-chairmanship of
Chief Justice, then Mr. Taft, and Mr. Frank P. Walsh, applied these principles29s
More recently in 1933 and x935, these principles were applied by the N.L.R.B.
under the chairmanship of Senator Wagner and including in its membership such
people as Walter Teagle, Pierre duPont, Louis Kirstein, and Gerald Swope as well as
other industrial and labor leaders.19 6
To all of which Mr. John W. Davis took issue:
The confusion between compulsory collective bargaining and voluntary arbitration
was deliberately fostered by the proponents of the National Labor Relations Act, but,
on analysis, it reveals how hopelessly contradictory the evidence in favor of collective
bargaining is. Thus it is declared in Section i of the Act and frequently has been asserted that "Experience proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce." Experience has proved no
such thing.197
As in other "labor-welfare" cases, the arguments were posed to answer
two questions: (i) Whether the government should regulate this phase of
industrial relations for the benefit of industry, or (2) whether industry
should be free to work the problem out by itself. The benefit to labor,
without more, was not made the prime concern of either the plaintiff or
defendant arguing before the Court.
In the Court's opinions, however, the relation of the legislation to the
welfare of employees was given more stress:
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in
dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the
maintenance of himself and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages
that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to
8
deal on an equality with their employer."9
They also reveal the assurance that the legislation will result in greater
industrial peace without damaging the interests of the employers:
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace.
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This
"94Ibid., at 8i.
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is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances199
The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does
not compel any agreement whatever ..... The theory of the Act is that free opportumity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote
industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act
in itself does not attempt to compel ..... The Act does not interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.200
Today the Amalgamated has collective agreements with clothing manufacturers
and contractors employing the greater number of the clothing workers in the United
States. These collective agreements have brought peace to that portion of the industry
that has entered such agreements ..... Since the signing of the collective agreement
for the New York area, the New York Clothing Manufacturers Exchange, Inc. and
the Amalgamated have handled jointly a total of 21,193 complaints and disputes. In
only 898 of these cases, or slightly over 4 per cent, was a resort to arbitration required
because of inability to agree. Of these 898, 30 per cent were settled by the impartial
chairman acting as a mediator; in the remainder he sat as an arbitrator and rendered a
decision ..... The President of the New York Clothing Manufacturers Exchange, Inc.,
....
has stated that the "organization of collective bargaining machinery .... has
been perhaps the largest single contributing factor to the lasting peace and harmony
that have characterized those clothing markets where the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America was the other contracting party to the collective agreement. ' '2OZ

IV
The fact that there is such a cluster of cases as those extending from
Holden v. Hardy to N.L.R.B. v. Jones-Laughlin-thefact that the arguments of counsel are drawn in a certain direction, as if by magnetic forceis but another way of stating that both the decisions and the arguments in
the cases are generated by and bear the congenital stamp of the dominant
social forces inherent within the American industrial society of the twentieth century. Perhaps this is what Mr. Justice Holmes had in mind in
his reference to the ". . . . natural outcome of a dominant opinion, ' ' 20 2 or
what Brooks Adams revealed in his statement: "The dominant class,
whether it be priests or usurers or soldiers or bankers, will shape the law
to favor themselves. ' ' 203 Applied to an industrial society, it is not difficult
to ascribe this dominance to the leaders of business and industry, and to
find in their values the roots from which the law in this field has drawn
some of the juices of life.
In appealing to the Court to sustain the "welfare legislation," the tendIbid., at 42.
, 2oo
Ibid., at 45.
20,N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 3o U.S. 58, 74 (1935).
202Lochner v. New York, ig U.S. 45, 76 (19o5).
203 Adams, Centralization and the Law 64 (19o6).
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ency on the part of counsel has been to make the conflict appear as one
between two segments of the business community, the more enlightened
against the less enlightened, instead of one between management and
labor. In the language of Professor Kales, this assumes the Court's role
to be that of ascertaining from the best available evidence what the more
"enlightened opinion;' of the "managing class" is, and then to impose this
opinion upon some of the "short-sighted" members.o 4 The briefs which
are planned to win "benefits" for the employees often resemble huge bookkeeping devices, in which such "welfare" measures as the regulation of
hours of labor, minimum wages, the installation of safety machinery,
elimination of scrip, collective bargaining, etc., are placed upon a ledger
sheet and translated into terms of business efficiency, business profits, or
threats to the stability of the business structure if the employee groups
are not appeased. To use the language of Werner Sombart, it is made to
appear as if "heaven and earth [are] a large business concern in which
everything that lives and moves is registered in a gigantic ledger in terms
of its money value. ' ' 2°s Veblen observed many years ago that this may be
due to the "settled habit of seeing all of the conjectures of life from the
business point of view," and "because the management of the affairs of
the community at large falls by common consent into the hands of business men and is guided by business considerations ..... So that whatever
policy furthers the commercial gains of those business men whose domicile
is within the national boundaries is felt to be beneficial to all the rest of
'
the population.1 201
2o4See Kales, op. cit. supra, n. 40: "What the court obviously has to do is to balance these
opposing tendencies of any given legislation and to determine its predominant effect. If its
predominant effect is that of correcting the mistakes of persistent stupidity and short-sighted
selfishness on the part of the managers, it should be valid. If its predominant effect is that of
reversing some fundamental principle upon which the social order rests, it should be void."
For an analysis of Kales' thesis, see 2 Boudin, Government by Judiciary, c.XL (1932). See
also, Witte, Labor Legislation and the Law, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 666: "Certain employers moreover came to support specific labor legislation to compel uniform standards and to equalize
competitive conditions, strengthened by the conviction that better working conditions,
whether granted voluntarily or imposed by legislation, tended to increase efficiency and productivity. Much labor legislation represents merely the compulsion of certain employers to
adopt standards which a large part of the industry has already adopted; progressive employers
are always ahead of legal requirements, and although they may favor self-government in industry they deem legislation to be necessary to bring laggards into line and deprive them of
competitive advantages. Such motives were supplemented by the desire to assure peaceful
relations between labor and capital." Prof. John B. Andrews in the introduction to his Labor
Laws in Action xiii (1938), expresses substantially the same point of view.
205Sombart, Capitalism, 3 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 197.
20 Veblen, op. cit supra n. 51 at 285, 289.
And more from Veblen: "for there is a naive,
unquestioning persuasion abroad among the body of the people to the effect that, in some occult way, the material interests of the populace coincide with the pecuniary interests of the
populace who live within the scope of the same set of governmental contrivances. This persua-
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The language of the Court in these cases does not always reveal the
extent to which it has given consideration to the "business point of view."
The fact that it is operative, however, may be gleaned from the nature of
the arguments of counsel. If one appeals to a source of power for relief,
e.g., counsel appealing to a Court, the very nature of the appeal, i.e., the
argumentative techniques used, not only would seem to disclose the nature
of the ends sought, but also would reveal something of the nature of the
institution wielding the power. An analogy will make this point clear:, If
the medicine man in appealing to the gods for succor assures them that it
should be granted because the first-born have without exception been
sacrificed, one gains insight into the values which motivate the gods. If
the prevailing notion of those arguing for the validity of labor-welfare
legislation were that the Court is not influenced by the "business
point of view," then one would expect to find counsel arguing for the
validity of the "welfare legislation" primarily on the ground that such
legislation would improve the lot of employees. However, if counsel arguing for the validity of the legislation repeatedly weave into the maze
of arguments the proposition that, no matter how much the employee is
benefited, the cost of the "benefit" will not be borne by the employer, or
the employer will actually profit as a result of the "welfare" measures,
then it may be reasonably assumed in these cases that the "business point
of view" is an integral part of the Court's mental makeup.
Obviously, there are motivating considerations other than the purely
economic, operative in the complex judicial mind. To maintain that economic factors constitute the sole motivating force in these cases would be
sheer folly. Although as Mr. justice Holmes has said, "there is in all men
a demand for the superlative," there is no desire in this study to place
one's self in the category of "the poor devil who has no other way of reaching it than by getting drunk." That these factors constitute an impressive
strain, however, would also be sheer folly to deny, in the light of the available evidence. That the strain does not appear too articulate in the language of the Court's decisions is of no moment. Like men in all walks of
life, many who are articulate in the formulation of opinions are often
inarticulate in formulating for themselves their own scheme of values. It
is the atmosphere in which they live and work-the things which they
take for granted, the values which they absorb almost instinctivelywhich often impel them to their conclusions.
sion is an article of popular metaphysics, in that it rests on an uncritically assumed solidarity
of interests, rather than on an insight into the relation of business enterprise to the maierial
welfare of thes6 clases who are not pril"ariy business men." Ibid:, at 285.

